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Intervenor, Tungsten Holdings, Inc., submits the following in reply to the Brief of
Respondents, Patrick and Ada Gardiner.
I. ISSUES PRESENTED

As the challengers of the decision by the Boundary County Board of Con~missioners,the
Gardiners must first show the Board committed error under I.C. 67-5279(3), and secondly that
such error has prejudiced a substantial right of that party:
[Tlhe Court shall affinn the zoning agency's action unless the Court finds that the
agency's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (a) in excess of
constitutional or statutory provisions; @) in excess of the statutory authority of the
agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion. (Citations omitted). The party attacking the agency's action must first
illustrate that it erred in the manner specified therein and must then show that a
substantial right of the party has been prejudiced. Neiphbovs v. Valley County,
Idaho --,
176 P.3d 126, 131 (2007).

-

The Gardiners' three (exclusive of their clailn for attorney's fees and costs) "Additional Issues
Presented on Appeal", and eight separate points of "Argument", can be distilled into the
following:
A.

Was the decision of the Board in violation of constitutional or statutory

provisions?
B.

Was the decision of the Board made upon unlawful procedure?

C.

Was the decision of the Board supported by substantial evidence in the record?
11. ARGUMENT

The approval of the special use permit allowing the operation of a gravel pit
A.
and rock quarry on the Tungsten property was consistent with applicable constitutional
and statutory provisions.

1.

Idaho Code 67-6512 allows counties to include provisions in their zoning

ordinances for processing and approval of applications for uses not otherwise specified.
ldaho Code 3 67-65 12(a) provides:
67-6512. Special use permits, conditions and procedures.

(a) As part of a zoning ordinance each governing board may provide by
ordinance adopted, amended, or repealed in accordance with the notice and
hearing procedures provided under section 67-6509, ldaho Code, for the
processing of applications for special or conditional use permits. A special use
permit may be granted to an applicant if the proposed use is conditionally
permitted by the terms of the ordinance, subject to conditions pursuant to
specific provisions of the ordinance, subject to the ability of political
subdivisions, including school districts, to provide services for the proposed use,
and when it is not in conflict with the plan. (Emphasis added).
Analysis of a statute or ordinance begins with the literal language of the enactment. Friends of
Favm to Mavlzet v. Valley County, 137 ldaho 192, 197, 46 P.3d 9, 14 (2002), (citations omitted)
A clear and simnple reading of I.C. § 67-6512, taken as a whole, reflects the legislature's

recognition that not all potential uses of land can be neatly categorized into one zone or another.
Sonle more intensive land uses could be considered and allowed if conditions of approval make
thein compatible with other uses allowed in a particular zone. Semantic gymnastics aside, I.C. §
67-6512(a) appears to use "special" and "conditional" interchangeably.' The purpose, though,
remains the same -- to allow counties to adopt ordinances that allow for the processing of other

I

Interestingly, the use ofthe phrase "conditional use permits," appears only in subsection (a) of
567-6512, Throughout the remainder of that section, reference is only nladc to "special use
permits," including subsection (d), which enumerates the kinds of conditions which may be
imposed on the granting of a "special use permit."

than specifically identified uses (whether called "special" or "conditional"), and approving such
"special use pennits" with conditions if needed to mitigate the potential for adverse impacts on
other development. I.C. $ 67-65 12(d).
2.

Boundary County did that.

Four (4) categories of uses are allowed in the AgricultureIForestry zoning district by
Boundary County ordinance: (1) uses by right, (2) permitted uses, (3) conditional uses, and (4)
special uses. (Zoning Ordinance Chapter 7, Section 1). Chapter 7, Section l.E then goes on to
provide that, "Any use not spectfied as a use by right or conditional use is eligible for
consideration as a special use, subject to the provisions &Chapter 13." To put it another way,
otherwise unscheduled uses are to be processed as applications for special use permits. The
Board may then impose conditions on the granting of a special use permit "to minimize potential
adverse impacts created by the special use.

In other words, special use permits are

"conditionally permitted" under the Zoning Ordinance. (Id.).
With its adoption of the language in Chapter 7, Section 1 .E, Boundary County enabled
consideration of unspecified uses which may not have been anticipated at the time of adoption of
the Zoning Ordinance, or which could be allowed with conditions of use and operation to
mitigate potential adverse impacts on neighboring properties, and allow thein lo be
"conditionally pennitted" in accordance with Chapter 13. The language used in the Zoning
Ordinance for unspecified or unanticipated uses is coinparable to that used in many jurisdictions'
zoning ordinances, and consistent with a fair reading of the intent of Idaho Code

5

67-6512,

leaving room for future uses and needs which could be accommodated in a variety of zoning

3.

An application for a gravel pit and rock ~ u a r r vis appropriately considered as a11

apolicatioi~for a "special use" in the Agriculture/Forestry zone under the Bou~ldarvCounty
Zoning Ordinance and Idaho Code 6 67-6512.
Gravel pits and rock quarries are not listed anywhere as a "conditional use", or any other
kind of use for that matter, in the Zoning Ordinance. Nevertheless, mining, particularly non-

metallic mining for gravel and sand, is recognized in the Boundary County Comprehensive Pla11
as an ilnportant natural and economic resource. (AR, pp. 0252 - 0254). It is unreasonable to
suggest that in the abscnce of specific lnention of gravel pits and rock quanies in the Zoning
Ordinance, they simply are not allowed, specially, conditionally or otherwise, anywhere in
Boundary County.
The Board's application and interpretation of its Zoning Ordinance is not only entitled to
a strong presumption of validity, it is fair, reasonable and in accordance with Idaho Code
6512.

5 67-

The Special Use Permit was "conditionally pennitted" by the Board; subject to

restrictions and conditions imposed pursuant to Chapter 13 of the Zoning Ordinance. Under
these circumstances, the decision of the Board was not "in excess of constitutional or statutory
provisions," (I.C. 67-5279(3)(a)), and therefore should be affirmed on appeal.

4.

The Board's decision was in conformal~ce with the Bou~~darvCounty

Comprehensive Plan.
The Gardiners' argument that the Board's decision is inconsistent with the County's

Comprehensive Plan inerely reflects their disagreement with the Board's conclusion that

Tungsten's project would not unreasonably interfere with the neighbors, and that the conditions
of approval are sufficient to mitigate any potential adverse impacts. Their argument also seems
to reflect a belief that they are entitled to live without any interference or impacts from their
neighbors.
In fact, the policy of the County, reflected in its Coinprehensive Plan, is to "advocate the
rights of property ownership, recognizing the primacy of private property rights and the sanctity
of private property ownership as enunciated in the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Articles 1 and 14 of the Idaho Constitution." (AR, p. 0243). Such advocacy of
course applies to all property owners, not just applicants, and not just their opponents.
In this case, there are competing private property interests. The special use being applied
for could be considered to be more intensive than other permitted uses iii the
Agriculture/Forestry zone (although coilsider the potential intensity of historically "agricultural"
and "forestry" activities

-

logging, harvesting, transporting, etc.). As such, the proposed use is

subject to "restrictions, requirements and conditions more strillgent than those applying generally
within the zone district." (AR, p. 0258). The proposed use may not create noise, traffic, odors,
dust or other nuisances substantially in excess ofpermitted uses within the zone distvict. (Zoning
Ordinance Chapter 13, Section 4.C.4, AR p. 0259).
The Board determined that Tungsten's proposed use is in conformance with the
Comprehensive Plan, as detailed in the Findings and Decision. (AR, pp. 0226-0227). Its
determination in that regard reflects a balancing of the competing interests inherent in an analysis
of compliance with a comprehensive plan, and should be affirmed on appeal

5.

The Gardiners did eniov the bellefit of an impartial tribunal.

Because decisions in zoning matters are quasi-judicial in nature, they are subject to due
process constraints. The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an "impartial and disinterested
tribunal." Turner v. City o f Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 159 P.3d 840, 846, citing Eacret v.

Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 784, 86 P.3d 494, 498 (2004). "When acting upon a quasi
judicial zoning matter, a governing board is neither a proponent nor an opponent of the proposal
at issue, but sits instead in the seat of a judge."

Id., citing Lowery v. Board o f Coun&

Commissioners for Ada Countv, 115 Idaho 64-71, 764 P.2d 431, 438 (1988). "Impartiality",
however, does not necessarily mean "lack of preconception." Instead, it means the lack of bias
as to either party, in order to assure the "equal application of the law." Id., citing Republican

Party ofMinnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775-76, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 2535, 153 L.Ed2d 694,705
(2002).
In their Brief, the Gardiners point to several "layers of pre-hearing bias", which they
assert deprived thein of an impartial tribunal. They impute nefarious motives to the Board and
the County's road and bridge supervisor, Jeff Gutshall, from what appears to be nothing more
than Mr. Gutshall's attempt to identify "a small rock source up north." (AR, p. 0139). They
decry the Commissioners' support for their road supervisor in the face of heated, and what they
felt to be unjustified, criticism leveled at him From an opponent to thc project (Mrs. Ponsness),
who had attempted to herself develop a competing pit and sell rock to the County. (AR, pp.
0139-0141). And, despite the stipulation to remand to cure possible taint of the proceedings by
virtue of Co~ninissionerDan Dinning's participation in the 2005 proceedings, they now argue the

taint remained simply because the remaining Board members reached the same conclusion
It would seem that Mr. Gutshall's colnmunications and efforts were legitimately within
the scope of his duties as the County road and bridge supervisor. More importantly, they were
disclosed as a matter of record. The Gardiner's knew about them - as evidenced by the fact that
they are now arguing about them.
By the same token, Commissioner Dan Dinning did NOT participate in any way, shape or
fonn in the 2006 proceedings. The Board did hold a new hearing. While much of the testimony
provided was redundant, all of the testimony and evidence were considered in its adoption of the
Findings and Decision
IJnder the circumstances, none of the Gardiners' "layers of pre-hearing bias," either
singly or collectively, support their claim of having been denied an "impartial tribunal."
6.

The Board's decision did not constitute unlawful "spot zoning."

?be Gardiners hither argue that the granting of the special use permit constituted an
illegal, "type two" spot zoning. As discussed in Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71,76-77,73
P.3d 84, 89-90 (2003):
A claim of "spot zoning" is essentially an argument the change in zoning is not in
accord with the comprehensive plan. There are two types of "spot zoning." Type
one spot zoning may silnply refer to a rezoliing of property for a use prohibited by
the original zoning classification.
The test for whether such a zone
reclassification is valid is whether the zone change is in accord with the
comprehensive plan. Type two spot zoning refers to a zone change that singles
out a parcel of land for use inconsistent with the pennitted use in the rest of the
zoning district for the benefit of an individual property owner. This latter type of
spot zoning is invalid. (Citations omitted).

Tungsten, of course, did not apply for a change in zoning. It applied for a special use
permit as allowed in the zoning district, to which the Board appended conditions and restrictions
to mitigate potential adversc impacts, and to ensure that the use would not create noise, traffic,
odors, dust or other nuisances substantially in excess ofpermitted uses within the zone district.
(Zoning Ordinance Chapter 13, Section 4.C.4, AR p. 0259). This was not a re-zoning or a spot
zoning. Carried to its logical extreme, the Gardiners' argument would preclude the permitting of
any special or conditional use not specifically identified in a zoning ordinance, and regardless of
its compatibility, with or without conditions, with outright permitted uses in the zone.
7.

The Board's "Findings and Decisions" satisfy the requirements of Idaho Code
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67-7535.
The Gardiners, disagreeing with the outcome, argue that the Board's decision Iacks the
requisite findings and conclusions to support their decision. Idaho Code S; 67-6535 requires that
the approval or denial of a land use application be in writing and:
Accotnpanied by a reasoned statement that explains the criteria and standards
considered relevant, states the relevant contested facts relied upon, and explains
the rationale for the decision based on the av~licable
vrovisions of the
..
colnprehensive plan, relevant ordinance and statutory provisions, pertinent
constitutional principles and factual information contained in the record.
I.C. 67-6535(b).
The Board's Findings and Decision entered August 7, 2006 demonstrate that the Board
did apply the criteria prescribed by the law, and that they did not act arbitrarily or on an ad-hoc
basis.

Worbnan Family Pavlnership v. City o f Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32 (1982).

When

considering the proceedings as a whole, in light of practical considerations and an emphasis on

fundamental fairness (I.C.

5 67-6535(c)), the Findings and Decision approving the Special Use

Permit are in conformance with the requirements of Idaho Code.
The Board's findings specifically draw attention to the concerns expressed by
surrounding landowners, most notably regarding the potential adverse effects of blasting on
surrounding water wells and the Trow Creelc Water Association, as well as the increased dust
and noise. Taking those factors and others into consideration, the Board imposed restrictions and
conditions to mitigale the effects of the operations on the surrounding public. As required, the
Board adopted findings and placed them in writing, set forth reasons for their decisions, and
referenced the applicable county ordinance sections. Under these circumsta~~ces,
the Board's
Findings and Decision were wholly in accordance with I.C.
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67-6535, as well as the Zoning

Ordinance.
B.

The decision of the Board was reached after following lawful procedure.

The Gardiners urge, this Court to conclude, as the District Court did, that the Board had
improperly failed to hold Tungsten to the "burden of persuasion" as to all of the requirements for
a special use pennit. The District Court had cited Ijischer v. Ciw o f Ketchurn, 141 Idaho 349,
109 ~ . 3 1091
' ~ (2005), which we know involved an incomplete application, and which relied
upon Ilowavd v. Canyon County I3d. O f Comm'vs, 128 Idaho 479,481,015 P.2d 709,711 (1996)
for the proposition that, "The burden of persnasioll is upon the applicant . . . to show that all of
the above requirements were satisfied." Of course, the Howavd case iilvolved a Canyon County
ordinance that specifically provided that the person or persons requesting relief under the Zoning
Ordinance shall have the burden of persuasion. Id.

In the instant case, there is no similar provision in the Boundary County Zoning
Ordinance.

The issue is not who carried the burden of persuasion, but whether there is

substa~ltialevidence in the record to support the decision. The Gardiners' arguments, again,
merely reflect their disagreement with the outcome -- essentially their disagreement with the
Board's determinations as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. This Court, of
course, "shall not substitute its judgment for tkat of the [Board] as to the weight of the evidence
on questions of fact." I.C. 5 67-5279(1).
C.

The decision of the Board is supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Despite citation to numerous examples of disagreements between the Gardiners and their
consultant, and the applicant and its supporters, the Gardiners argue in their brief that there was
no evidence whatsoever to support the Board's decision. In reality, they'rc arguing that they and
their witnesses were Inore credible than Tungsten and its supporters. In other words, they want
this Court to substitute its judgment for that of the Board, on the weight of the evidence as to
issues of fact
The Gardiners further argue that there is no evidence to support the finding that there are
"terms and conditions" which mitigate the potential for negative adverse impacts. This argument
is puzzling in light of not only the applicant's own application, defining the scope of the
operations, but also the list of eleven (1 1) conditions of approval which the Board found would
be "sufficient . . . to assure public safety and to mitigate potential adverse effects":
(1)
All surface mining operations, including crushing, loading,
tnatcrial storage, etc., shall be conducted on the site and shall not encroach onto
County Road 46 except as normal traffic. Access shall be by private drive

approved by Boundary county Road and Bridge.
Dust abatement measures shall be applied as needed so as to
(2)
minimize dust.
(3)
All operations shall follow "Best Management Practices for
Mining in Idaho," published by the Idaho Department of Lands November 16,
1992, or as updated.

Blast [sic] shall occur on no more than twelve (12) days per
(4)
calendar year. Blasting shall be conducted on a weekday between the hours of 8
a.m. and 5 p.m. Boundary Coui~tyPlanning and Zoning and property owners
within five hundred (500) feet of the boundaries of parcels RP65N01W172211A
and RP67N01W200012A shall be notified, in writing, at least fifteen (15) days in
advance of the proposed date of blasting, specifying the date, time and length of
time the blasting is expected to occur.

(5)
Subpart U.

All blasting shall meet OSHA requirements established at 29 CFR

Crushing operations shall be allowed from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m.
(6)
Monday through Friday between the dates of February 15 and May 2 each year.
Prior to establishing the pennitted surface mining operation, the
(7)
applicant shall comply with all requirements established by the Idaho Department
of Lands, to include filing a reclamation plan and posting the required bond. A
copy of those documents shall be provided [sic] the Boundary County Planning
and Zoning office prior to the onset of mining operations.
The Planning and Zoning office shall be notified, in writing, when
(8)
the reclamation bond is redeemed or in the event bond is forfeited. This special
use pennit shall lapse upoil bond redemption or forfeiture, and no further mining
operations may take place without issuance of a new special use permit.
(9)
The seven acre portion of parcels IiP65N01W172211A and
RP65N01W2000012A depicted in the site plan of application SUP 0505 shall be
formally identified by record of survey filed and recordcd with the Recording
Clerk of Boundary County.
(10) Any person or persons employed to conduct blasting operations
shall be notified prior to blasting of concerns expressed during the hearing process

over the poteiltial for damage to area water systems, including Trow Creek Water
Association.
(1 1) Any person employed to conduct blasting operations [sic] be
qualified, licensed and insured.
(AR, pp. 0232-0233).
Certainly if the Gardiners thought these conditions were at all specious, ill-defined, or
unenforceable, they were free to suggest additional conditions for collsideratio~lduring the more
than two (2) year course ofthese proceedings.
The substance of the Gardiners' argurneilts seem to he focused on two (2) issues: (1) the
potential impact of blasting and crushing operatio~~s
on their black Angus cattle operations, and
(2) the potential impact of blasting on their wells.
With respect to the impact of the operations on their cattle, the Gardiners presented
scholarly articles (all hearsay of course), to the effect that stress is bad for cattle. (AR, pp. 00890107). Mr. Cardiner opined that "blastitlg and the constant noise of a rock crusher would disrupt
the synchronization process for a successful embryo transfer and artificial insemination program,
and ~vouldmake it impossible for [them] to stay in business." (AR, p. 0109). The Gardiners
were merely speculating, apparently, that the blasting and ciushing would cause noise and
vibration to travel more than one-half (112) mile Gust to their home from the pit site), across two
major ridge lines (Amendment to Transcript of July 24, 2006 hearing, p. 7), and still retain
sufficient intensity to actually stress their cattle. To the contrary, Rick Dinning testified that it is
physically impossible for the Gardiners to see the pit from their property due to the two (2) major
ridge lines in between. (Amendment to Trallscript of July 24, 2006 hearing, p. 7). He also

testified that through the one drilling and shooting in the spring of 2006, the sound was
"surprisingly quiet and muffled", and described by one of the licensed experts as "a series of 22
caliber priiners going off with an underground rumble" (in fact, that's exactly what it sounded
like to him). Id. George Hays, a third generation cattle rancl~erin Boundary County, and the
President of the Mission Creek Water Association, testified that blasting for highway
improveinents near Mission Creek was determined not to have caused disruptions to the Mission
Creek Water Association's wells, id, (Clerk's Transcript July 26, 2005 Nearing, pp. 7-8). Mr.
Hays further testified that the blasting appeared to be nothing Inore than a "muffled thump" - the
cows never iooked up from eating their grass." Id.
With respect to the potential impact on the Gardiners' wells, the Gardiners did apparently
retain a hydrologist, Ms. Uhlman. I-ler report to the Gardiners is ill the record. (AII pp. 00790084). Of course, Ms. Uhlman did not attend the hearings in person, where the Board could
assess her credibility or even ask questions. It appears that the primary risk, from Ms. IJhlinan's
point of view, is to the Gardiner's irrigation well. Such risk &om the pit excavation, would arise
when the natural drainage from land surface would be lowered from 1,860 feet to 1,760 feet
mean sea level on the western-most boundary. (AR p. 0083). Flowever, this was contrary to
Rick Dinning's findings and observations - not having seen water running out of other rock
faces (as where the railroad was cut), and the fact that, based upon the well driller's report, the
bottom of the pit would still be 33 to 53 feet above the water elevation in the well. (Amendment
to Transcript of July 24, 2006 hearing, p. 7).
The Board also reviewed Ms. Uhlman's report, and concluded that, based on the distance

of tlie pit to those wells, testimony from the applicant, and the permit and reclamation plan under
the jurisdiction of the Idaho Department of Lands, it was "reasonable to determine that direct
threat to these wells is a remote possibility, and the threat can be further mitigated with
additional restriction requiring that those conducting the blasting be licensed, certified and
insured." (Findings and Decision p. 9, AR, pp. 0234).
There is conflicting testimony on these and other issues pertinent to the Board's Findings
and Decision. The Board weighed the evidence, found its facts, and made a decision. Again,
this Court is not to substitute its judgment for that of tlie Board, and should defer to the Board's
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Neighbors v. Vallev CounQ 176 P.3d at 131.
There is, furthermore, a strong presumption in favor of the validity of the actions of zoning
authorities. Id.; Howard, 128 Idaho at 480. The decision of the Board in this matter is supported
by substantial evidence in the record as a whole, and should be affirmed on appeal.

III. CONCLUSION
Tungste~~
I-loldings, Inc. properly made application to Bonner County for a Special Use
Pennit allowing it to conduct a gravel pit and rock crushing operatio11 on seven (7) of its three
hundred thirty (330) acres near Porthill in Boundary County. Boundary County allows property
owners to petition the County for a special use permit for uses which are not otherwise described
or defined in the Zoning Ordinance, includillg gravel pits and rock quarries. The application was
approved with conditions designed to lninimize potential adverse impacts created by the special
use. Not all potential adverse impacts are required to be eliminated, but only minimized to
ensure the proposed special use will not create noise, traffic, odors, dust or other nuisances

substantially in excess of permitted uses within the zone district. Boundary County's Zoning
Ordinallce is in accordance with the authority granted to it under Idaho Code § 67-6512.
The Board's decision to grant the Special Use Pennit is supported by substantial evidence
in the record as a whole. The Board's Findings and Decision includes a reasoned statement that
explains the criteria and standards considered relevant, states the relevant contested facts relied
upon, and explaills the rationale Tor the decision based on the applicable provisions of the
ordinance and statutory provisions, pertinent constitutional
comprehensive plan, releva~~t
principles and factual inhnnation contained in the record, in conformance with Idaho Code
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67-6535.
The decision of the Board of County Comn~issionersfor Boundary County granting
Tungsten Holdings, lnc. a Special Use Permit should be affirmed.
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